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Boards operate notionally in a liminal, nonhierarchical space, neither inside the company nor outside,
creating ambiguity between service and control functions and fostering tolerance of it. With repeated
corporate governance crises, however, new prescriptions institutionalized in law, regulation, and codes
of conduct have added signiﬁcance to the control side, marked by monitoring and compliance tasks.
Taking a cue from the strategy process and strategy-as-practice literature, this study revisits the work of
directors on the service side: their engagement in strategizing. Formalization of board processes has led
to greater structure and reduced the liminality of the board. Using interviews with 20 directors from a
range of organization types, this study ﬁnds that directors experiment respond to increased institu-
tionalization of board practice by seeking out new liminal spaces and informal practices, with implica-
tions for theory of boards, board activities, and public policy.
© 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Directors have multiple identities, both insider and outsider,
conﬂicted between service and control functions (Hillman,
Nicholson, & Shropshire, 2008). They are urged to provide control
in agency theory (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976)
and to provide service in stewardship theory (Davis, Schoorman, &
Donaldson, 1997). What was once considered an elite and profes-
sional domain, largely without external prescription, has become
articulated and then institutionalized through codes, laws and
regulation, focusing on the control side.What has happened then to
service and, in particular, to the board's contribution to strategy?
The board's role in strategy has been a subject of process-
inspired investigation, both before and after the corporate gover-
nance crises of the early 2000s. These studies found a limited role in
strategy making by boards, authorizing but only rarely formulating
strategy (McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999; Pye, 2002; Stiles, 2001), and
more recently signs of dissatisfaction over how little room was left
for the creative side of being a director (see review by Pugliese et al.,
2009).
In the mainstream corporate governance literature and policy. Nordberg).
on, M., & Nordberg, D., Boa
017), http://dx.doi.org/10.101documents, nonexecutive directors are outsiders, brought inside
primarily to challenge (control) and to impart new ideas and
facilitate access to scarce and valuable external resources (service).
Executive directors are insiders invited to act as outsiders,
providing detailed understanding of operations (service) while also
challenging their executive peers (control). The chair, particularly
in the model of the nonexecutive, independent chair of the UK
board, acts as a bridge between executives and nonexecutives.
As this paper argues, together they create and inhabit a liminal
space (Turner, 1977), neither inside nor outside. The freedom from
internal routines and institutionalized behavior should free up
thinking and encourage both challenge and contributions of new
insights. However, the institutionalization of formal board practices
can create what Cohen (2007) and Pentland and Feldman (2008)
term “dead” routines that inhibit creative contributions. They do
so by asserting hierarchy and structuring what had been a liminal
space. In so doing, it solidiﬁes the line between inside and outside.
This study examines what happens between directors under the
pressure of increasing institutionalization of the boardroom. Taking
a cue from the literature of strategy process (Pettigrew, 2012) and
strategy-as-practice (Rouleau, 2013; Whittington, 1996), and from
studies of liminal actors other than boardmembers (Czarniawska&
Mazza, 2003; Sturdy, Schwarz, & Spicer, 2006), it explores how
boards strategize in the wake of the corporate governance crisis ofrds strategizing in liminal spaces: Process and practice, formal and
6/j.emj.2017.03.008
M. Concannon, D. Nordberg / European Management Journal xxx (2017) 1e122the early 2000s and after the long ﬁnancial crisis later in that
decade.
First, the contributions of this paper lie in identifying emerging,
informal practices to de-structure the board to recreate liminality
and reassert a strategic role for the board. These practices are
valorized, creating new rituals and routines away from the board-
room, restructuring a liminal social space to facilitate the service
role of boards separate from the boardroom and its control-focused
formalities. Second, we ﬁnd that boards may seek to adopt more
informal practices to overcome the rigidities of institutionalized
control-oriented pressures and de-institutionalize, at least
temporarily, the logic of boards as mechanisms of control. Third,
the study outlines research directions to establish how board
practices inform strategizing and its outcomes, and importantly
into what risks develop from doing such suspension of the control
function, and the implications for theory, practice, and public
policy.
The paper is structured as follows:We beginwith the concept of
liminality, a condition arising in the anthropology literature of
being on the threshold of a more structured state, which has
attracted attention in organization studies in the past decade. Next,
we consider institutions and their role in constraining certain ac-
tions while easing the path for others, which then points toward a
liminal interpretation of board work and how that work has
become more structured in response to successive corporate
governance failures. We then explore the literature on one aspect of
directors' workdthe board's role in strategy. After a brief exposi-
tion of research on strategy process and practice and a discussion of
methods, we present ﬁndings of an exploratory study with 20 di-
rectors of different types of companies in the British Channel
Islands. We conclude by suggesting that directors, and in particular
the nonexecutives, see their role not just in bringing outside per-
spectives and monitoring management but also as unsettling hi-
erarchies to spur creative thinking by boards, both inside the
boardroom and in informal, liminal spaces.
2. Literature review
This paper integrates concepts in three strands of the literature:
organization studies, corporate governance, and strategy. The
concept of liminality is set against strategy processes and practice
and then reset in the context of the work of boards of directors.
2.1. Liminality
The concept of liminality was introduced by the French an-
thropologist van Gennep (1909/2013) in discussing the transitional
phase involved in social rites of passage. As developed by Turner
(1977) in work on African tribal practices, liminality is the space
and time on the limen, Latin for threshold, situated between one
state and the next. Turner's work concerned rituals of initiation,
during which the innocence and freedom of youth gives way to the
hierarchy and order of adult society. It is a social space of ambiguity,
in which the elders join the initiant as equals in play, largely
without rules and structures, and then introduce order and assert
authority during the transition to adult society. Liminal processes
offer a blend “of lowliness and sacredness, of homogeneity and
comradeship” (Turner,1977, p. 96). Liminality thus fosters a sense of
temporary equality among participants, which Turner calls anti-
structure, and a sense of fellow feeling, which he terms communi-
tas. In organizational studies of change (e.g., Pettigrew, 1987),
liminality is part of the inner context, facilitating processes be-
tween actors.
In recent years, the concept has been used to explain a number
of organizational phenomena. As Sturdy et al. (2006) observed, thePlease cite this article in press as: Concannon, M., & Nordberg, D., Boa
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what occurs at the threshold of organizations. The dividing lines
between organizations have become blurred by the impermanence
of jobs (Conroy & O'Leary-Kelly, 2014; Garsten, 1999), by seeing
enterprises operating as networks (Tempest & Starkey, 2004) or as
nodes within networks (Powell, White, Koput, & Owen-Smith,
2005), or through strategic alliances or in ecosystems of enter-
prises and entrepreneurs (Rong & Shi, 2014).
Liminality involves an “unstable zone where the established
rules are suspended; it is a culturally creative and in a sense
dangerous space” (Kennedy & Fiss, 2013, pp. 1146e1147). Liminal
spaces are ones where individual actors suspend allegiances to
their “home” organization or identify with multiple organizations
and the communitas of the collective. They involve closeness, not
separation, and the absence or suspension of power; they are the
lived experience, albeit temporary, of those who inhabit them (cf.
Taylor & Spicer, 2007).
Analogies to rites of passage are obvious when new employees
join an organization or enter less well-deﬁned associations, where
a transition from one state to another involves ambiguity, devel-
opment of ties, and the temporary suspension of hierarchy. But
organizational scholars have also identiﬁed liminal spaces of a
more permanent type. For example, Sturdy (1997) viewed consul-
tants as actors who both address and reinforce management anx-
iety. Building on that view, Czarniawska and Mazza (2003)
observed that consultants create liminal spaces and then inhabit
them for long periods: “there are a growing number of pro-
fessionals who accept liminality as an ever present condition and
thereby end it” (2003, p. 286).
Another study of management consulting (Sturdy et al., 2006)
found that liminal spaces, such as working dinners, were used
tactically by consultants to build momentum for organizational
change. The study concluded that liminal spaces can operate in
parallel with more formal organizational spaces and can be used to
color them. Moreover, while liminal spaces may set aside the
formal hierarchies, they nonetheless may have “precisely and so-
cially deﬁned rituals and routines, beyond those associated with
transition from one state to another” and be “highly structured and
conservative as well as being creative and unsettling” (Sturdy et al.,
2006, p. 931). These studies suggested that liminal spaces might
supplant one set of rules with another, with the effect of dein-
stitutionalizing, at least temporarily, the existing hierarchy to open
new avenues of thinking.
2.2. Liminality and (de)institutionalization
Early studies drawing upon institutional theory sought to
explain the persistence of social structures and practices (DiMaggio
& Powell, 1983; Zucker, 1977) even when they had ceased to serve
the intended purpose (e.g., Meyer & Rowan, 1977). While explain-
ing continuity, this work left unanswered how change occurs in
highly institutionalized settings.
DiMaggio (1988) introduced the concept of institutional entre-
preneurship as a mechanism to explain the change in institution-
alized settings. Greenwood, Suddaby, and Hinings (2002) saw
external jolts precipitating a process of deinstitutionalization, in
which new actors or new relationships between actors permit
institutional entrepreneurship to surface. Institutional logics
(Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012)
embed meaning to the rules and justify the hierarchies to give
legitimacy to incumbent practices. In liminal spaces, logics are
suspended along with hierarchies and rules, which can be seen as
inducing at least temporary deinstitutionalization. Using liminal
spaces can be a mechanism of responding to an external jolt or as a
means of provoking change in anticipation of, or absent, such a jolt.rds strategizing in liminal spaces: Process and practice, formal and
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ular interest to this study. Consultants provide knowledge and skills
similar to the service function of nonexecutive directors, and con-
sultants have long been seen as an alternative route to such advice
(W.F. Forbes & Rosenbloom, 1977). Accounts of liminality in con-
sultancy (Czarniawska & Mazza, 2003; Sturdy et al., 2006) can be
read as echoes of induced deinstitutionalization, as the way di-
rectors inﬂuence institutionalization of logics of corporate gover-
nance (e.g., Lok, 2010; Nordberg & McNulty, 2013; Westphal &
Zajac, 1998), not least within the Anglo-American tradition of
unitary boards, to which we turn next.
2.3. Boards, roles, and liminality
The concept of liminality has been used only sparingly to
describe the work of boards. One exception is McInerney-Lacombe,
Bilimoria, and Salipante (2008), who discussed the liminal position
of women directors joining corporate boards. However, the concept
of liminality can be applied more widely and, as we argue, to di-
rectors in general.
According to securities law, directors are insiders. They possess
valuable, nonpublic information about the company. In many
countries, directors bear personal, unlimited liability for the com-
pany's actions, subject to proviso of the “business judgment rule,”
initiated in Delaware and copied less or more formally in many
other jurisdictions. In addition, directors share collective liability
irrespective of whether they are also employees of the company
(executive directors) or serve only as directors (nonexecutive
directors).
Nonexecutive directors (called “outside” directors in the US
usage) are responsible for the business but are not in it. They rarely
spend more than a few days a month working in these capacities,
making them, in effect, outside-insiders. Executive directors (or
“inside” directors) are asked upon joining boards to set aside in-
ternal allegiances and act in the best interests of the company. In so
doing, they make themselves inside-outsiders. In the boardroom,
even the chief executive ofﬁcer is expected to act as a director ﬁrst.
This discussion suggests that we can consider boardrooms as
liminal spaces. Directors include insiders and outsiders who enter
the boardroom (a sacred space), set aside hierarchy and become
equals (antistructure), and work together toward shared goals
(communitas). Moreover, their roles are often viewed as deeply
ambiguous.
An early study of boards (Zahra & Pearce, 1989) identiﬁed three
roles performed by directorsdservice, strategy, and con-
troldthough the subsequent literature has tended to subsume
strategy under service. The service function views directors as
doing their best for the company, with links to stewardship theory
(Davis et al., 1997). They provide insights from their business and
other experience and, in particular in the case of nonexecutives, act
as boundary spanners (Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997), providing
the company with special access to valuable and scarce resources
(cf. Barney, 1991) outside the company's direct control. These di-
rectors are meant to see external developments with a different
view to those involved in the day-to-day business. In contrast,
control involves the board in monitoring management and holding
them to account to address the principal-agent problem at the
heart of agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989).
Hillman and Dalziel (2003) viewed the combination of moni-
toring of management (the control function) and resource provi-
sion (the service function) as creating board capital, which then
enhances ﬁrm performance. The two functions involve potentially
conﬂicting identities and role ambiguity, which if well balanced can
help them cope with complex situations (Hillman et al., 2008).
These observations support the difﬁcult relationship posited by D.Please cite this article in press as: Concannon, M., & Nordberg, D., Boa
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boardroom and board cohesiveness.
Role ambiguity, the insideeoutside dilemma, the (temporary)
suspension of hierarchy, the collective effort and responsibility, and
the ritualistic nature of board activities in a sacred space point to-
ward a view of board meetings as liminal occasions. However,
corporate malfeasance has created strains in the balancing act of
board between their service and control functions.
That strain became evident in the early 1990s with the pro-
mulgation of the Cadbury Code (1992), a set of standards much
emulated around the world (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). As
Nordberg andMcNulty (2013) documented, it imposed structure on
the previously largely unstructured work of the UK boards. It was
followed in the early 2000s with demands for greater board inde-
pendence in the wake of the failures of Enron and many other
corporations. This pressuredfrom law, regulation, and institu-
tionalization of “best” practice in codes of conductdasserts hier-
archy, prioritizes boardroom challenge, and emphasizes cognitive
conﬂict over board cohesiveness (D. P. Forbes & Milliken, 1999). In
creating accountability, a central purpose of the code, it empha-
sized the need for board monitoring and control, making manifest
in board practice what Power (1997, 2000) has called the “audit
society.”
What occurs, then, when circumstancesdmarket conditions of
corporate excess and institutional response through regu-
lationdpush against the liminality of the board and create pres-
sures for greater sub- or super-liminal positioning of the actors?
What gives way: service or control, monitoring of management or
resource provision? To answer these questions, we need to
consider ﬁrst what is involved and at risk in the service role of
boards. Let us look brieﬂy at the roles that boards play in strategy
and strategizing.
2.4. Strategy in the work of directors
Boards may be formally responsible for all aspects of the cor-
poration, but research into boardroom strategy making suggests a
rather limited role. In an early qualitative study of the work of UK
nonexecutive directors, McNulty and Pettigrew (1996) found that
these directors contributed mainly through persuasion and coali-
tion building, while the chair used assertiveness to inﬂuence
corporate direction. Contrary to other accounts of boards merely
“rubber stamping” the strategy decisions of the executives, their
follow-up study (McNulty& Pettigrew,1999) found that these part-
time boardmembers not only formallymade strategic decisions but
also shaped those decisions and shaped the content, context and
conduct of strategy formulation. Similarly, Stiles (2001) found that
while boards may occasionally rubber stamp senior managers’
plans, such minimalist approaches were rare. Boards provided both
a gatekeeping function tomaintain the quality of strategic decisions
and help instill conﬁdence among the executives. In reﬂecting on
her longitudinal study of UK boards, Pye (2002) also saw strate-
gizing as a process led by the executives, except in times of crisisShe
also found, however, that directors saw their roles increasingly as
identifying strategic focus in ways that were responsive to share-
holder concerns.
These studies pre-date the collapses of Enron, WorldCom, and a
host of other companies in the US, Europe, and Asia during the
shakeout in the early 2000s, and those following the global banking
and ﬁnancial crisis of 2007e2009 and ensuing corporate gover-
nance reforms. More recently, however, in a qualitative study of
boards of eight US companies, Bailey and Peck (2013) found that
procedural rationality in strategy setting was associated with
shared mental models, balanced power between the outside di-
rectors, and CEO and board leadership. Their study suggest thatrds strategizing in liminal spaces: Process and practice, formal and
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while boards that engaged in “political behavior” had not.
In a sweeping review of the literature on boards and strategy,
Pugliese et al. (2009, p. 292) observed that “the emphasis on board
independence and control may hinder the board contribution to
the strategic decision making.” They called for greater attention to
institutional and context-speciﬁc approach to study how boards
contribute to strategy. Against this background, we turn to alter-
native and, in certain ways, complementary approaches to strategy
researchdprocess and strategy-as-practicedbefore applying it to
the context of boards and strategy.
2.5. Strategy process and practice
A counterpoint to the strategic planning of the 1960s, the
strategy process literature traces its roots to the work of Mintzberg
(1973, 1987), Pettigrew (1987), Burgelman (1988), and others who
viewed strategy as contextual and dynamic. Processes involvemore
than sequential stops on the way to a deﬁned outcome. Instead of
rationalist waves of formulation, implementation, and control, this
view strategy unfolds and develops in its enactment, a process of
becoming. Pettigrew (2012) associated the duality of context and
action in strategy with structuration in Giddens (1979). It is related
to what Chia and Holt (2009) called “strategy without design.” This
literature sees strategy emerging from iterated contestation and
revision, not as a plan; strategy is an evolving process, occurring
over time.
An extension comes in the literature of strategy-as-practice (S-
a-P), a microlevel approach that has gained impetus in recent years
(Johnson, Langley, Melin, & Whittington, 2007), building on the
process approach but drilling down into the work of managers and
their strategizing (Whittington, 1996). Some studies focus on the
concrete activities such as strategy workshops and projects and
how these activities inform and develop practitioner thinking
about corporate direction (Whittington, Molloy, Mayer, & Smith,
2006). Rouleau (2013) discussed how the ﬁeld has developed ﬁve
distinct perspectives, involving practice as management action, as a
set of tools, as knowledge, as organizational resources, and as a
global discourse. S-a-P moves away from the premise that strategy
is something that an organization has to the things people do.
The liminal nature of strategy workshops and similar activities
has attracted attention in the strategy-as-practice literature.
Workshops, away-days, and similar activities are spatially and
temporally disconnected from day-to-day work (Hodgkinson,
Whittington, Johnson, & Schwarz, 2006; Hydle, 2015).
Such activities also invoke different meaning systems.
Whittington et al. (2006) described how participants engage in
creation of symbolic artifacts. Heracleous and Jacobs (2008)
showed how those involved in strategizing use embodied meta-
phor, with its implicit repetition and thus ritualistic nature that is
nonetheless outside the routine. Such artifacts and symbolic de-
vices contribute to the specialness of the practices, setting the stage
for a departure from normal work arrangements. Lombardo and
Kvålshaugen (2014) suggested that creativity is enhanced by
practices that shatter constraints, often enacted when actors are
outside conventional settings.
Drawing directly on the literature of liminality in anthropology,
Johnson, Prashantham, Floyd, and Bourque (2010) showed how
removal to a different space and the use of liturgy and specialists
enhanced the effectiveness of the sessions. These elements helped
establish communitas, while the endorsement of the lead manager
of the legitimacy of the specialists encouraged antistructure
(Turner, 1977). While high degrees of each of removal, use of liturgy
and specialists, and antistructure did not correspond directly with
success of the sessions, all three seemed to contribute toPlease cite this article in press as: Concannon, M., & Nordberg, D., Boa
informal, European Management Journal (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.101effectiveness.
Many of these studies have illuminated the roles of less senior
employees shaping what Mintzberg (1987) termed realized strat-
egy, as the suspension of hierarchy gives them license to break with
norms. Our study extends upward by considering board-level
strategizing, where the creative work of strategizing is connected
to the controlling side of corporate policy, adding a layer of
complexity to the purpose of the practices. Moreover, board-level
strategizing is a difﬁcult ﬁeld of study owing to the conﬁdenti-
ality board proceedings and the reluctance of gatekeepers to grant
access.
The research was conducted at a time of considerable change in
the institutional environment through interviews with 20 directors
across a range of different types of organizations in the British
Channel Islands. Being known as offshore ﬁnancial centers and less
generously as tax havens, the islands’ economies are dominated by
banking and asset management services. Boards in the islands, as
elsewhere in the world, face a stricter regulatory environment in
the aftermath of the ﬁnancial crisis, particularly for ﬁrms engaged
in ﬁnancial services. These organizations also sense growing in-
ternational political and social pressure for compliance, particularly
in view of allegations about tax avoidance and money laundering.
As we will discuss, the directors interviewed felt a strong need to
improve the performance of their businesses and therefore to
reassess strategy during straitened economic times.
3. Methods
The study was conducted along these lines: ﬁeld research was
performed by one of the authors, a person involved in the ﬁnancial
services industry and working as a company secretary to boards of
subsidiary ﬁrms in the sector. The company secretary is tradition-
ally a compliance-oriented role, but the role involves growing
attention to strategy in its position as an internal adviser to boards
and particularly to the chair (McNulty & Stewart, 2015).
Company secretaries in British ﬁrms play a similar role to
corporate secretaries in US companies. UK company secretaries are
less likely to act as general counsel, however. As British practice
emphasizes the need for an independent chair, they are also less
likely to be beholden to the CEO than a US corporate secretary
might be. A professional acquaintance of this researcher facilitated
initial access to directors. In addition, the secretary of an association
of nonexecutive directors provided assistance.
The ﬁrst round of interviews led to snowball sampling to
identify further individuals across different organizational forms.
Then, the researchers used purposive sampling to identify inter-
view subjects that would round out the range of roles and types of
ﬁrms.
The sample involved two companies in consumer services, six in
fund managers, seven owner-managed ﬁrms, two partnerships,
and three subsidiaries of major corporations headquartered in
other jurisdictions. Of the 20 interviewees, 12 worked in highly
regulated industries, mainly in ﬁnancial services, eight in less
regulated ones. The dissimilarity constrains the generalizability of
the ﬁndings but helps in an interpretive study to ensure validity in
identifying the future research agenda.
Semistructured interviews led respondents from the description
of their businesses and boards toward how the ﬁrms conducted
strategy discussions. The interviews were all transcribed and
analyzed for themes that emerged from the literature (e.g., from
McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999; Stiles, 2001), including strategy pro-
cesses, the boards’ role in shaping strategy and approving strategy,
before considering practices in use, particularly the social setting of
strategy discussions. Two main sets of categorization developed
from the analysis. The ﬁrst, following the depiction of board roles inrds strategizing in liminal spaces: Process and practice, formal and
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provision, and strategizing. This theory-led approach arose from
our interest in strategy processes and practices, motivating this
return to a tripartite view of the work of directors and separating
the input of resources from the activities of strategizing (see Table 1,
in the Findings section, below).
The second set of categories arose from the data, assessing the
elements of practice and process, based on location, time, structure,
and stated purpose. During data analysis, types and settings of
activities suggested a second level of categorization involving
clusters of formal and informal sessions (see Table 3). The analysis
showed strategizing present in both types and in particular valo-
rized in the latter, while monitoring dominated discussion of the
former, occasionally demonized. Resource provision appeared in
both. This thematic analysis heightened our interest in informal
settings, pointing us to pay closer attention to theoretical insights
from the liminality literature and institutional theory concerning
the structuration of board activities in a climate of stronger regu-
lative scrutiny of boards and leading to a further iteration of theTable 1





The topco which is the strategy setter, direction, ideas, blue sky





Freedom within boundaries; providing the resources, provide leadership




Acting as advice and counsel and sounding board, give direction, guidance
what they need from us in terms of getting that to happen. (ED) (ED)
D1
(Partnership)
We give the executive board our views on direction and strategy and th
board is heavily involved in strategy but of course direction is given by t
Strategy ultimately decided by the board, but partners feed into it. (ED)
A
(Partnership)




Discussed and debated at ManCom and when we got ourselves happy w





This would be [the shareholder] leading the board if I'm honest because a
and that's the viewwewant the board and company to follow. What do w




These are real boards. It's a live discussion. The beginning to end stuff. T




The board is prime in terms of running the company. Very active for a non
to protect the interests of shareholders essentially. (NED) (NED)
P
(Fund)
If strategy is required, the board and full board gets involved. So all the stra




Greater focus on the direction aspect rather than just the control. Challe
F
(Fund)
Business strategy is undoubtedly decided by the board. We decided we n
amalgamation.




The senior management and executives will formulate strategy and pres
executive directors are coming to the board with already preplanned ide
company. So the nonexecs, there is not necessarily to rubber stamp it, bu
and, if necessary, agree it.








Completely leading, directingddirecting the team, bringing the execs to
E
(Fund)
Represent the shareholders and hold the manager to account, make sure
they'll do.
Being a good steward by bringing knowledge and experience. (NED) (NE
Please cite this article in press as: Concannon, M., & Nordberg, D., Boa
informal, European Management Journal (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.101literature review.
4. Findings
Drawing on Pettigrew's context-process-content model
approach (see Pettigrew & Whipp, 1991), we brieﬂy consider the
changing circumstances surrounding boards' strategy work, the
scope, process, and substance of the work. We then explore at the
practice level how the work was conducted.
4.1. Context of board's strategy work
The directors in our study work in a changing institutional
context for regulation, corporate governance standards, and un-
derstandings of the roles of boards. After the UK ﬁrst articulated
director duties in a major restatement of company law (UK
Parliament, 2006), the Channel Island governments adopted
roughly parallel changes just before the onset of the ﬁnancial crisis.






think differently. (Executive Director e
✓ ✓
, guidancedbig picture decisions. ✓ ✓
, challenge, and support. Then to know ✓ ✓ ✓




ters; very involved and collaborative ✓
ith it was then put to the Partnership.
oney lets really start investing in the
✓ ✓
s an active shareholder we have a view
e want to spend our money on or cease
✓ ✓ ✓
otal. So, the board absolutely is the
ead the strategy, to develop it, et cetera.
✓
executive board. In a fund you are there ✓ ✓
tegy activity and all the groundwork is
s. (NED) (NED)
✓ ✓
nge strategic formulation. (NED) (NED) ✓
eeded to get bigger, hence we did the
from the shareholder to raise more
✓ ✓
ent it to the board as proposals. So the
as about the strategic direction of the
t it's to consider it, challenge it, test it,
tty of formulating the strategy. (NED)
✓
✓
account. (ED) (ED) ✓ ✓
manager is doing what they've said
D)
✓ ✓
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some variations, by the islands’ regulators. Changes to the legal
framework led directors to reﬂect on both their ﬁduciary duties and
the effects of the ﬁnancial crisis on their ﬁrms and strategies, and to
do so in a climate of strong enforcement actions against ﬁnancial
ﬁrms in some jurisdictions and heightened scrutiny of presumed
tax havens.
The interviews were semistructured seeking to identify pro-
cesses and practices in use, but participants were allowed and even
encouraged to explore other concerns, in particular in relationship
to the changing context. In this section, we ﬁrst focus on ideas
about processes and content, then more granular practices, before
interpreting these accounts against the strategy literature.
4.2. Board strategic processes and content
All the interviewees described how they had been involved in
strategic activities performed by either their statutory board or a
formalized committee of the board or partnership. Responses
related to this strategic role were articulated quite differently. La-
bels attributed to the role describing the process included
“collaborative” or “consultative.”
Scope of board's role in strategy formation. Participants
described the role of their boards in strategy (1) as acting as cata-
lysts for strategic thinking and activity and participating in the
entire process (“strategy formation”), (2) as mainly conﬁrming
strategic direction and facilitating implementation (“resource
provision”), or (3) to acting in a narrow oversight and monitoring
capacity (“control”). A summary of comments showing how they
invoke strategic input, resource provision, and control perspectives
is given in Table 1. These categories conform broadly to the
tripartite view of boards in Zahra and Pearce (1989), where the
more active role of “strategy formation” shows a qualitative
different relationship from the more limited service function of
advice and facilitation we categorize under resource provision.
Active or passive participation. Several participants indicated
that the strategic role of the board has developed from perhaps
what once may have been considered amore passive role towhat is
now a more active and engaged role. Four participantsdall non-
executivesdspontaneously raised the concept of “rubber stamp-
ing” but emphasized that boards no longer act in this manner. One
participant was particularly emphatic in articulating his view that
boards were now alert to strategic issues, when boards may not
have been in the past. Table 2 outlines examples of comments
concerning the active/passive concept.
Content of strategy formation. In our study, strategy formation
was not assessed against any preconceived notion but on the
constructions of those involved. Participants discussed a variety of
board activities, which, in their minds, represented strategic work.
These ranged from what might be considered typical processes ofTable 2





I think the role of the board is changing quite dramaticallydI think it
much greater focus on the direction aspect rather than just the contro
I
(Fund)
Pretty active I would say… yes very active for a nonexecutivedand I do
E
(Fund)
Getting more activedlittle less passivity. (NED)
J
(Subsidiary)
So the nonexecs, there is not necessarily to rubber stamp it, but it's to
P
(Fund)
There are very few boards where I'm involved that it is rubber stamp
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implicit strategic activities such as structured communication and
networking activities or interactions with key stakeholders.
All about connections all the time all about networking but that
is key strategic activity for my businesse it is about the dialogue
that you have and the relationships that you develop. (ED,
Source M, Owner-managed)
Many of the directors identiﬁed succession planning as a key
strategic activity; however, there were differences in approach as to
whether this activity was performed by the board or within some
other forum. While most directors considered succession planning
at the full board, three indicated that this activity was undertaken
by another group such as management or partners, and another
three stated succession planning discussionswere not heldwithin a
formally constituted board meeting.
4.3. Board strategic practices
Participants described a variety of activities undertaken and
forums used by their respective boards in relation to strategic
matters. These practice-level insights led to a second-level cate-
gorization, in which practices clustered in two types: “formal” and
“informal.” The formal type relates to practices undertaken within
the forum of a duly constituted board or board committee meeting,
while the informal type represents practices undertaken by boards
or directors outside this forum. The various practices and activities
articulated by participants as constituting board strategic activity
are summarized and categorized, according to these emergent
constructs (see Table 3).
A recurrent theme is the use of informal practices by boards in
undertaking strategizing as evidenced by the data. All but one of
the participants referenced some type of practice they considered
to be strategizing and we categorize as informal. Those activities
relate not only to the more traditional aspects of strategy devel-
opment but are also those identiﬁed by participants as allowing
them to discharge their strategic responsibilities. While informal
practices are prominent within the data, these practices do not
preclude other, more formalized practices; they are, rather, inter-
locked and complementary.
“Strategy is best considered away from the formal board
meeting e if you have an agenda to go through you are con-
strained in time e you take it away from the formal board
meeting …. you don't want strategic discussions to be con-
strained by time e you let people say what they want to say.”
(NED, Source P, Fund)
“You've got to be a participant in something in order to be a
successful analyst of it. If you're purely an observer I don't thinkis changing from being one that was administrative, operational to there being a
l. (NED)
n't really think that we are particularly nonexecutive on this particular fund. (NED)
consider it, challenge it, test it, and, if necessary, agree it. (NED)
ing exercisedif strategy is required the board and full board gets involved. (NED)
rds strategizing in liminal spaces: Process and practice, formal and
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Formal executive committee or similar
Time on the agenda






Monthly meetings with management
Staff monthly/quarterly meetings
Training
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only operate in the boardroom you should have nothing to do
with strategy whatsoever … because you're not involved with
the company.” (NED, Source S, Fund)
Several respondents expressed concern that the agendas of
formal board meetings were concerned with regulatory and risk
considerations, crowding strategy off the agenda. That suggests
important matters about the future direction of the ﬁrm are
shunted off, leading directors to focus more ondand value more
highlydthe informal settings of the board (see Table 4).
The strategy away day. The use of time removed from the ofﬁce
to focus on key matters, including strategy, is a prevalent activity.
Most participants described strategizing as involving some type of
time away from the ofﬁce, outside the formal process of board
meetings. The labels used for these particular strategic episodes
include: planning day; blue-sky day; and conference. Of those
boards that hold strategy “away days,” the frequency was generally
once per annum, although some hold several away days per year.
When discussing these practices, most participants construed such
strategic episodes as positive. However, only a few directors pro-
vided a negative response, and they were concerned about the
utility of the exercise, not the principle (Table 5).
Other informal practices. In some ways, more remarkable was
how participants valorized practices in setting even less formal
than away-days, for example, social events and interpersonalTable 4




It's something I raised on the board with the chairmandwe spend toom
actually asked for ameeting on its ownwithout any GFSC [Guernsey Fin
the company going?





The great problem with meetings is that you spend all your time gett
E
(Fund)
What we've found happens and happened a couple of times this year
regulatory issues that had to be dealt with … and then strategy relate
O
(Subsidiary)
Probably like a lot of other boards these days where it's dominated by
compliance type stuff. Absolutely yeah, it's the wrong stuff. (ED)
S
(Fund)
Well, worse happens at some board meetings, the board meetings are
R
(Subsidiary)
I suppose we do struggle a bit, the board tend to focus on governance, r
shouldn'tdthe board shouldn't do that and we don't want board pack
the board. So it's a kind of a contradiction. (ED)
F
(Fund)
But what with all the regulation at the moment and corporate govern
probably longer. (NED)
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and explore strategic issues (see Table 6). Some participants
mentioned attendance at conferences, for example, when the di-
rectors might convene on the fringe to discuss what they had
learned and how it might inﬂuence board decisions. Others valued
informal discussions over dinner are then supplemented by further
discussions, if required, in the boardroom. Discussions held in these
informal environments were referenced as providing a less struc-
tured, and thereby more conducive, forum for free-ﬂowing and
open discussion. In line with the S-a-P approach, a number of
microactivities undertaken by boards and directors were construed
by participants as constituting strategic practices. These micro-
activities have been categorized as informal. Similar to the obser-
vations of Chia and MacKay (2007, p. 222), these activities are
oriented toward “work, talk, activities and competencies” of those
that do strategy practice, in this study boards.
All but one participant referred to some form of communication
as an element of their strategic practices. This included either
communication with staff within the organization or to broader
stakeholder groups including clients and shareholders. Ad-hoc
discussions between board members were also recognized as
representing a communication practice that is adopted by boards
when strategic matters may need to be discussed.
“So it's simple, I'll just walk around the corner. It's nice to have
everybody in one space.”(ED, Source Q, Owner-managed)uch time talking about regulatory issues and not about strategy. It's bonkers and I
ancial Services Commission] stuff, any regulatory stuffdjust to talk about where is
nt is the regulatory stuff. It's being able to put one to one side to be able to develop
ing tired doing the boring tedious stuff. (NED)
where we have had meetings where there have been speciﬁc compliance and
d to it gets pushed off due to time constraints. (NED)
compliance and regulatory type stuff … which then leads into procedural
the same length and the corporate governance has taken over the agenda. (NED)
isk, operational things. I know the regulator comes along and says, the GFSC oh you
s stuffed with regulatory stuff. Then they issuedeverything must be approved by
ance and then going through the portfolio, they are normally four to ﬁve hours
rds strategizing in liminal spaces: Process and practice, formal and
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Table 5
Positive and negative views on strategy away-days.
Positive Negative (these comments are exhaustive of the negatives in these interviews)
There's always an away day and we do our very best to hold it at a different location
so that the location helps inform the decisions. So we tend to remember the
decisions that were made in a particular location.
(NED, Company T, Owner-managed)
We have again, like all good textbooks, we have done them. Have we found them
particularly useful? No, I don't think so.
(ED, Company C, Owner-managed)
I mean strategy days are like a religious retreatdyou've got a chance to put down the
management accounts, put down the day to day pressures and think about the life
of your business. They're brilliant. I think they're really excellent and I wholly
recommend them. The nature of critical, intuitive, creative, perceptive thought is
it doesn't come so readily in a structured environment and you've got to let people
go. (Company S, NED, Fund)
I don't think it was worth the money. There was no reason to go to a golf course in
Ireland. It was a pain in the arse getting anywhere from Guernsey, changing plane
and all that sort of thing. So I think the trade-off of having a good dinner is probably
….
(NED, Company F, Fund)
We go for an off-site for an afternoon beforedand the next day have the board. So
that's been quite useful yeah exactly.
(ED, Company R, Subsidiary)
No, I've been on those before and I would seriously question the value of them.
(ED, Company Q, Owner-managed)
Way we do thatdwe have blue sky day. We go away next week, at least once a year
maybe twice a year. It's great we love it. Get things done, think about direction,
look at the numbersdwhat is being done well, what is being done badly.
(NED, Company B, Owner-managed)
We also have 2 strategy days a year, speciﬁcally to focus on strategy. I love that we
can walk around, because our boardroom's got no windows so it's a bit grim. So I
try not to use that. Gosh yes, they love it so much, they want to do it every time.
Now they're having lots and then they realize actually this is so important. Yes,
but they really get into it.
(ED, Company G, Consumer services)
Last week, had our 86th planning meeting. We do roughly three a year. We had it
quarterly when we started and we've now moved to 3 a year. That's almost 30
years of planning meetings.
(NED, Company T, Owner-managed)
We think it's really important to get together as much as possible, it's amazing how
much a personal relationship will ensure a decision is made and having a robust
conversation with somebody you like much better than you can with somebody
you don't like
(ED, Company H, Partnership)
M. Concannon, D. Nordberg / European Management Journal xxx (2017) 1e128“Okay, sowe have an AGM every year and that is whenwe, warts
and all, communicate the e well I say warts and all, we're
completely honest with the staff in terms of our strategy and I
think that's why it works.” (ED, Source A, Partnership)
All participants referenced some type of additional work that is
required of them between board meetings as board strategizing.
They highlighted emails, telephone calls, site visits, training, or
face-to-face meetings with management or other key groups.
These observations show formal board meetings dominated by
compliance-related tasks, while strategizing comes more to the
fore in semiformal away days and the informal use of dinners, social
gatherings, and ad hoc communications. Importantly, however,
participants were discussing general board activities, not responses
to crises, when compliance with ﬁduciary duties and strategic
concerns fuse. But the sense of frustration evident in some of the
comments suggests that the formal board agenda is skewed toward
the routine and necessary, rather than the exciting and creative.
The formality of the boardroom suggests, therefore, a structured
way of proceeding in the ascendance, with directors seeking out
different practices to exercise their imaginations about the busi-
ness. It also suggests that some directors feel their boards are
“attached” to the business, in part through engaging in both formal
and informal practices where they strategize and engage in
resource provision, while others see their boards as only “semi-
attached,” concerned mainly with control tasks and only passively
involved in the business.4.4. Strategy as liminal work of boards
The picture this study paints of the work of these boards reso-
nates with a conceptualization of the board as a liminal space.Please cite this article in press as: Concannon, M., & Nordberg, D., Boa
informal, European Management Journal (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.101Evaluating strategy away days in a general business context, rather
than the board's role in strategy, Johnson et al. (2010) concluded
such workshops create liminality. The hierarchy of the organization
is put to the side and the ambiguity of the situation creates a sense
of communitas and antistructure (Turner, 1977). At the end of
strategy workshops for employees, participants re-enter the busi-
ness and the hierarchy and the old hierarchy apply though not
perhaps the old rules concerning practices and direction. Liminal
spaces are used to effect change.
Such strategy workshops are often facilitated by outside con-
sultants whose presence helps to dismantle the hierarchy, putting
the elders in the position of peers to the experienced “old hands”
and new recruits alike. Consultants themselves occupy a liminal
space on a semipermanent basis, as Czarniawska and Mazza (2003)
observed, creating temporary uncertainty for the beneﬁt of the
client and creating more permanent uncertainty for the beneﬁt of
their own business relationship with the client (Czarniawska,
2013). They achieve this state by structuring the seemingly un-
structured liminal space, making use of informal and formal ses-
sions to create ambiguity and anxiety (Sturdy et al., 2006).
Our study suggests that boards of directors also inhabit liminal
spaces, thoughwith a twist. In their roles as boundary spanners and
for their roles in strategy formation and resource provision,
nonexecutive directors are often seen as semipermanent consul-
tants, while their control functions exert more formal responsibility
and hierarchy. What the directors in our study seem to be saying is
that a board dominated by control and compliance, what we have
called a semiattached board, relies more on formal structure,
compliance and agendas, while the attached board also ﬁnds way
to set structures and formalities aside for more creative conversa-
tions. This suggests suspension of an institutional logic focused on
compliance and imposed through successive regulatory in-







I've got one coming actually for another companywhere the chairmanwants to position somethingwith the investmentmanager. He says right, I want you to
have a one to one because they trust you. (ED)
E
(Fund)
In terms of explicit strategy we tend to have board dinnersdthat will be the board onlydidea we have a forum in which we can speak freelydand deﬁnitely
strategic discussions happen within that forum.
boards meet for coffee chatdin between cycledwe'll meet to discuss things.
It needs to have a forum something in the middledmight just be a bitchy coffee but better to have a bitchy coffee and get things out in the open before the
meetingdboard meeting is not the forum for that. (NED)
M
(Owner/M)
They are important part of the soft aspects of how a board operates and you have to strike a good balance between boards being social in the sense that they
can get on with each other. (NED)
F
(Fund)
We normally have a dinner beforehand, which has been very useful to chat through topics so we don't waste time in the meeting.
No, normally that's done over dinner. Somebody comes up with an idea, then we thrash it out, then we say let's explore this in a board meeting.
We probably do more at the dinner than we do in the board.
Well it started with a lunch at Nautique with the chairman of the other company. (NED)
S
(Fund)
Now we get 50% of the equity of that company around a table every year at lunch. (NED)
P
(Fund)
We have a strategic meeting on Sunday evening, so we spent 3e4 h going through strategies over dinner, it was a proper meeting and all the papers were
circulated over the weekend, people came in to Guernsey, we met over dinner and had the board meeting the next morning, 8 a.m. on Monday morning.
Like a brainstorming session, it was free ﬂowing conversation andwhat ifs, have you considered this, why not so it was not in a formal environment of a board
meeting with a minute taker so one of the people amongst us, one of the board members offered to take some notes. (NED)
B
(Owner/M)
We have weekly what we call morning prayers of the group boarddvery informal chat at least once a week. Ad-hoc decision or strategic matter get round a
phone and do it. (ED)
S
(Fund)
I've got companies where I'm a nonexec where we have 2000 emails a year and god knows how many phone conversations. (NED)
J
(Subsidiary)
But when I got in there I went and met all the people that I felt that I should need to meet, all the heads of the different business lines and get to know them.
For this role … you can't do this on the back of a fag packet. You've got to really give your time. (NED)
N
(Owner/M)
One of the advantages of being in this ofﬁce is that the whole of board are just located in this corridor. (ED)
M
(Fund)
I've insisted onmonthly investment meetings where we as the board of NEDs are involved so that we have more insight into what they are thinkingdwe can
understand rationaledwe can challenge it. (NED)
F
(Fund)
The other thing I do is I do go two or three times a year to see the investment manager and the broker face to face and discuss things with them. Occasionally I
go and see major shareholders. (NED)
S
(Fund)
It's understanding your peer group. It's understanding your marketplace. It's understanding your customer. It's understanding your economics. It's melding




Everyone on the board will have done lots of site visits and some have done immersive …. training which is quite involved. We often spend a lot of time
investing in portfolio tools and dashboards to help us visualize performance and dynamics of all of these sites. (NED)
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in valorizing less formal settings for their strategy work, these di-
rectors may overlook the sorts of dangers that led to the wide-
spread abuses in the major corporate governance scandals. In those
cases, value creation became subordinated to managerialism of a
strongly self-interested variety. In the semiformal setting of a
strategy away day, such discussions may be clear to all and possibly
minuted as well. Less formal practice entails a risk to transparency
and accountability even as they create the freedom to ﬁnd novel
solutions to business problems. For example, managing succession
planning through informal discussions among ad hoc groupings of
directors raises the specter of cozy decision-making at odds with
what Nordberg and McNulty (2013, p. 365) call the “logic of
accountability” in UK corporate governance code and practice.
This study is set in a particular time and place and involves
particular actors who despite their diversity provide only a limited
view of the range and possibilities of boards. Moreover, the
research design depends on recollected past action with its
incumbent risk of post hoc reconstructions of events (Golden,
1992), of concern here particularly for the sense drawn about
board practices before the ﬁnancial crisis. But its ﬁndings point to a
number of tantalizing ideas for further research intowhat wemight
call governance-as-practice, with implications for theory and
practice, as well as policy.4.5. Theoretical implications
Viewing boards as liminal spaces helps to explain the paradox of
the inside-outsider and outside-insiders in unitary boards. It alsoPlease cite this article in press as: Concannon, M., & Nordberg, D., Boa
informal, European Management Journal (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.101illuminates why two-tier board structures of the type mandated by
law in Germany and common inmany other European countries are
thought to perform better in control functions, where formality,
compliance and hierarchy matter, than in creative, exploratory, and
strategic work associated with the service role of boards.
The role ambiguity of directors on unitary boards is often
considered one of the strengths of this form and of its weaknesses.
The uncomfortable relationship D. P. Forbes and Milliken (1999)
saw between cognitive conﬂict and board cohesion may require
ﬂipping between a liminal and what we can think of as a super-
liminal state, when a hierarchy is asserted with the board on top,
in the interests of accountability. Further practice-focused research
into both boards and individual directors may help identify how
they achieve (or fail to achieve) this balance.
The practice-level activities feed into process steps. Compliance-
driven agendas in the new institutional context squeeze out limi-
nality and with it strategizing. The boards we have called attached
invented ways around the problem. The new liminal settings for
off-agenda discussions contribute to development of strategic re-
sponses to the altered market and institutional context.
Our analysis suggests that different practices could lead to
similar process outcomes, that is, that away days, dinners, private
conversations, and other informal practices could be substitute
mechanisms to create the liminality needed to achieve collabora-
tive and creative strategic discussions. Further research can identify
whether the detail of process outcomes might differ depending on
the type of practices used and whether practitioners draw different
meanings from the varieties of practice.
The analysis also raises questions about whether the creativityrds strategizing in liminal spaces: Process and practice, formal and
6/j.emj.2017.03.008
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the practices of strategizing themselves become institutionalized.
We see hints of this in the negative comments about away-days, for
example, when the ritual is empty of substance. Suspension of hi-
erarchy seems likely to be suppressed the more routinizing the
activities become.
This risk is clear in the strategy-as-practice literature, where
routine behavior is associated more with strategic planning for
predictable environments than reﬂexivity needed in more dynamic
settings (Jarratt& Stiles, 2010). It also resonateswith the distinction
Turner (1977, p. 132) draws between the “spontaneity and imme-
diacy” of communitas and the “jural-political character” of struc-
tured social spaces, and with his contention that spontaneity is
difﬁcult to sustain because communitas soon develops its own
norms and structure. In our study at the process level, boards
sought a more norm-free space in which to strategize. Formalizing
the underlying practices might concentrate power in the hands of
those who set the agenda, asserting a hierarchy in a space the di-
rectors valued for its antistructure.
4.6. Practical implications
How boards organize their activities may also beneﬁt from a
better understanding of the liminal nature of board work. Our di-
rectors seem to suggest that things were different in the days
before the crises in corporate governance and before the resulting
changes in law, regulation and codes of conduct skewed thework of
boards toward compliance. They also point to experimentation to
recreate more liminal settings where the creative side of directing
can ﬂourish, freed from the shackles of the agenda, and the struc-
ture of committees and procedure.
The “good old days” may not have been so good, of course, but
studies to identify what works and does not work could inform the
practices of boards. If problems exist in segregating the two types of
activities, research might help identify how such tensions can be
eased, for example, in the adoption of practices that can in a single
meeting or setting ﬂip from the formal to the informal, from
structure to the antistructure of liminal spaces.
The people in our sample generally appreciated the freedom
that comes in a return to a liminal state for strategy discussions. But
as suggested above, there are risks that did not ﬁgure greatly in the
interviews. Work conducted informally, that is, liminally but in the
company's name and under its regulatory regimes, may lead di-
rectors to fall short of their ﬁduciary duties or may open the door to
the excessive coziness that decades of corporate governance reform
have sought to correct. Practitioners may wish to extend their
experimentation to explore unobtrusive ways of capturing the
content of such discussions without diluting too much their
substance.
Moreover, there is a risk that informality can lead to practices
that isolate individuals or exclude them from taking part in group
processes. In view of the emphasis in both practice and policy on
expanding board diversity, particularly in gender (Adams &
Ferreira, 2009; Chen, Eshleman, & Soileau, 2016) and critical mass
studies of boards (e.g., Torchia, Calabro, & Huse, 2011), further
research into informal settings for strategizing might consider both
how isolated individuals cope with a shift to liminality and how
practices in liminal spaces can be shaped to be inclusive.
4.7. Policy directions
There is a risk, as Pugliese et al. (2009) observed, that best
practices, board independence and control may get in the way of
boards making a strategic contribution. The structures imposed by
the Cadbury Code and subsequent formulations on British practice,Please cite this article in press as: Concannon, M., & Nordberg, D., Boa
informal, European Management Journal (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.101and in other countries that followed its prescriptions, have no
doubt heightened awareness of the role boards can play in chal-
lenging the hegemony of senior management and the chief exec-
utive ofﬁcer. But Cadbury and all the subsequent authors of the
code repeatedly warned that these measures were not enough if a
unitary board were to fulﬁll its promise (Nordberg & McNulty,
2013). The UK Corporate Governance Code now holds that half
the directors should be independent nonexecutives, but it still
urges boards to have a range of executive directors to offer deeper
discussions of direction and purpose.
In this regard, practice in the US has diverged from that in the
UK.Many US listed companies have only the CEO and chief ﬁnancial
ofﬁcer on the board, with all the rest outsiders. Others now have
only the CEO as an executive member. This may give the appear-
ance of compliance with the best practice; but it also creates the
situation where the CEO can more easily exploit information
asymmetries to control the boardroom, dominate the agenda
setting, and stiﬂe debate (Joseph, Ocasio, & McDonnell, 2014).
Seeing boards in a liminal space may remind policymakers of the
beneﬁts of encouraging board discretion rather than managerial
discretion (cf. Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009), but also to
be aware that inadvertently encouraging informal practices may
open the way to undocumented processes reached by quiet co-
alitions rather than the board.
5. Conclusions
By viewing boards as existing in a state of a permanent rite of
passage, this study has, ﬁrst, illuminated informal practices that
draw upon liminality to release creativity into the strategy work of
boards. Second, directors valorize such practices because they de-
institutionalize formal processes associated with the control func-
tion, which they see as having grown in the wake of waves of crises
and corporate governance and governance reform. Third, these
indications of changes in practice point to the need for research in
theories of corporate governance and the work of boards, with
implications and public policy.
Directors, and especially the nonexecutives, see their role not
just as bringing outside perspectives into the ﬁrm, but also as un-
settling the hierarchies inside it, and, at least temporarily opening
the rules of the game to question. Such de-institutionalization of
the boardroom can be used as a vehicle for change, even absent a
precipitating jolt from outside (Greenwood et al., 2002).
Boards can be places similar in their “lowliness and sacredness,
of homogeneity and comradeship” to the initiation rites Turner
(1977, p. 96) observed. They are the meeting place of inside-
outsiders and outside-insiders who share insights and collective
responsibility and hold each other to account, creating a sense of
fellow-feeling in Turner's word communitas. Structure and anti-
structure coexist in boards that seem to function well or at least in
those where directors seem to think they do. Directors and poli-
cymakers seem to want boards to be the sort of “dangerous space”
where creativity can emerge (Kennedy & Fiss, 2013, p. 1147) and
risks are taken, and where creativity is monitored and risks
controlled.
Seeing boards as operating in liminal ways may encourage ac-
ademics, practitioners, and policymakers alike to look beyond the
formalities of board structures, procedures, and agendas. It reminds
us to consider what happens in less formal settings, where the
emphasis may fall less on value protection and more on value
creation.
References
Adams, R. B., & Ferreira, D. (2009). Women in the boardroom and their impact onrds strategizing in liminal spaces: Process and practice, formal and
6/j.emj.2017.03.008
M. Concannon, D. Nordberg / European Management Journal xxx (2017) 1e12 11governance and performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 94(2), 291e309.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jﬁneco.2008.10.007.
Aguilera, R. V., & Cuervo-Cazurra, A. (2009). Codes of good governance. Corporate
Governance: An International Review, 17(3), 376e387.
Bailey, B. C., & Peck, S. I. (2013). Boardroom strategic decision-making Style: Un-
derstanding the antecedents. Corporate Governance: An International Review,
21(2), 131e146. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/corg.12008.
Barney, J. B. (1991). Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of
Management, 17(1), 99e120.
Burgelman, R. A. (1988). Strategy Making as a Social Learning Process: The Case of
Internal Corporate Venturing. Interfaces, 18(3), 74e85.
Cadbury, A. (1992). The ﬁnancial aspects of corporate governance. Retrieved
September 1, 2015, from http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cadbury.pdf.
Chen, Y., Eshleman, J. D., & Soileau, J. S. (2016). Board gender diversity and internal
control weaknesses. Advances in Accounting, 33, 11e19. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.adiac.2016.04.005.
Chia, R., & Holt, R. (2009). Strategy without design: The Silent efﬁcacy of indirect
action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Chia, R., & MacKay, B. (2007). Post-processual challenges for the emerging strategy-
as-practice perspective: Discovering strategy in the logic of practice. Human
Relations, 60(1), 217e242. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0018726707075291.
Cohen, M. D. (2007). Reading Dewey: Reﬂections on the study of routine. Organi-
zation Studies, 28(5), 773e786. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0170840606077620.
Conroy, S. A., & O'Leary-Kelly, A. M. (2014). Letting go and moving on: Work-related
identity loss and recovery. Academy of Management Review, 39(1), 67e87.
http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/amr.2011.0396.
Czarniawska, B. (2013). The uncertainties of consulting. International Studies of
Management and Organization, 43(3), 11e21. http://dx.doi.org/10.2753/
IMO0020-8825430301.
Czarniawska, B., & Mazza, C. (2003). Consulting as a liminal space. Human Relations,
56(3), 267e290. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0018726703056003612.
Davis, J. H., Schoorman, F. D., & Donaldson, L. (1997). Toward a stewardship theory
of management. Academy of Management Review, 22(1), 20e47.
DiMaggio, P. J. (1988). Interest and agency in institutional theory. In L. G. Zucker
(Ed.), Institutional patterns and culture (pp. 3e32) (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger).
DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. (1983). The iron cage Revisited: Institutional
isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational ﬁelds. American So-
ciological Review, 48(2), 147e160.
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Agency Theory: An assessment and review. Academy of
Management Review, 14(1), 57e74. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/
AMR.1989.4279003.
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. Journal of
Law and Economics, 23(2), 301e325. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.94034.
Finkelstein, S., Hambrick, D. C., & Cannella, A. A., Jr. (2009). Strategic leadership:
Theory and research on executives, top management teams, and boards. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Forbes, D. P., & Milliken, F. J. (1999). Cognition and corporate governance: Under-
standing boards of directors as strategic decision-making groups. Academy of
Management Review, 24(3), 489e505. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/
AMR.1999.2202133.
Forbes, W. F., & Rosenbloom, A. H. (1977). A shield for directors: The outside
consultant. Management Review, 66(12), 26.
Friedland, R., & Alford, R. R. (1991). Bringing society back in: Symbols, practices, and
institutional contradictions. In W. W. Powell, & P. DiMaggio (Eds.), The new
institutionalism in organizational analysis (pp. 232e263). Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Garsten, C. (1999). Betwixt and between: Temporary employees as liminal subjects
in ﬂexible organizations. Organization Studies, 20(4), 601e617. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1177/0170840699204004.
Geletkanycz, M. A., & Hambrick, D. C. (1997). The external ties of top Executives:
Implications for strategic choice and performance. Administrative Science
Quarterly, 42(4), 654e681.
van Gennep, A. (1909/2013). The rites of passage. London: Routledge.
Giddens, A. (1979). Central problems in social theory: Action, structure, and contra-
diction in social analysis. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Golden, B. R. (1992). Research Notes: The Past is the Pastdor is it? The Use of
Retrospective Accounts as Indicators of Past Strategy. Academy of Management
Journal, 35(4), 848e860. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/256318.
Greenwood, R., Suddaby, R., & Hinings, C. R. (2002). Theorizing change: The role of
professional associations in the transformation of institutionalized ﬁelds.
Academy of Management Journal, 45(1), 58e80. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/
3069285.
Heracleous, L., & Jacobs, C. D. (2008). Crafting strategy: The role of embodied
metaphors. Long Range Planning, 41(3), 309e325. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.lrp.2008.02.011.
Hillman, A. J., & Dalziel, T. (2003). Boards of directors and ﬁrm performance:
Integrating agency and resource dependence perspectives. Academy of Man-
agement Review, 28(3), 383e396.
Hillman, A. J., Nicholson, G., & Shropshire, C. (2008). Directors' multiple identities,
identiﬁcation, and board monitoring and resource provision. ORGANIZATION
SCIENCE, 19(3), 441e456. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/orsc.1080.0355.
Hodgkinson, G. P., Whittington, R., Johnson, G., & Schwarz, M. (2006). The role of
strategy workshops in strategy development processes: Formality, communi-
cation,co-ordination and inclusion. Long Range Planning, 39(5), 479e496. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.lrp.2006.07.003.Please cite this article in press as: Concannon, M., & Nordberg, D., Boa
informal, European Management Journal (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.101Hydle, K. M. (2015). Temporal and spatial dimensions of strategizing. Organization
Studies, 36(5), 643e663. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0170840615571957.
Jarratt, D., & Stiles, D. (2010). How are methodologies and tools framing managers'
strategizing practice in competitive strategy development? British Journal of
Management, 21(1), 28e43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8551.2009.00665.x.
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the Firm: Managerial behavior,
agency costs and ownership structure. The Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4),
305e360. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.94043.
Johnson, G., Langley, A., Melin, L., & Whittington, R. (2007). Strategy as practice:
Research directions and resources. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Johnson, G., Prashantham, S., Floyd, S. W., & Bourque, N. (2010). The ritualization of
strategy workshops. Organization Studies, 31(12), 1589e1618. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1177/0170840610376146.
Lombardo, S., & Kvålshaugen, R. (2014). Constraint-shattering practices and creative
action in organizations. Organization Studies, 35(4), 587e611. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1177/0170840613517597.
Joseph, J., Ocasio, W., & McDonnell, M.-H. (2014). The structural elaboration of board
Independence: Executive power, institutional logics, and the adoption of CEO-
only board structures in U.S. Corporate governance. Academy of Management
Journal, 57(6), 1834e1858. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/amj.2012.0253.
Kennedy, M. T., & Fiss, P. C. (2013). An ontological turn in categories Research: From
standards of legitimacy to evidence of actuality. Journal of Management Studies,
50(6), 1138e1154. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/joms.12031.
Lok, J. (2010). Institutional logics as identity projects. Academy of Management
Journal, 53(6), 1305e1335. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/AMJ.2010.57317866.
McInerney-Lacombe, N., Bilimoria, D., & Salipante, P. F. (2008). Championing the
discussion of tough Issues: Howwomen corporate directors contribute to board
deliberations. In S. Vinnicombe, V. Singh, R. J. Burke, D. Bilimoria, & M. Huse
(Eds.), Women on corporate boards of Directors: International research and
practice (pp. 123e139). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
McNulty, T., & Pettigrew, A. (1996). The contribution, power and inﬂuence of part-
time board members. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 4(3),
160e179. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.1996.tb00145.x.
McNulty, T., & Pettigrew, A. (1999). Strategists on the board. Organization Studies,
20(1), 47e74.
McNulty, T., & Stewart, A. (2015). Developing the governance space: A study of the
role and potential of the company secretary in and around the board of di-
rectors. Organization Studies, 36(4), 513e535. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/
0170840614556919.
Meyer, J. W., & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized Organizations: Formal structure
as myth and ceremony. American Journal of Sociology, 83(2), 340e363.
Mintzberg, H. (1973). The nature of managerial work. New York: Harper & Row.
Mintzberg, H. (1987). Crafting strategy. Harvard Business Review, 65(4), 66e75.
Nordberg, D., & McNulty, T. (2013). Creating better boards through codiﬁcation:
Possibilities and limitations in UK corporate governance, 1992-2010. Business
History, 55(3), 348e374. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00076791.2012.712964.
Pentland, B. T., & Feldman, M. S. (2008). Designing routines: On the folly of
designing artifacts, while hoping for patterns of action. Information and Orga-
nization, 18(4), 235e250. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.infoandorg.2008.08.001.
Pettigrew, A. M. (1987). Context and action in the transformation of the ﬁrm. Journal
of Management Studies, 24(6), 649e670. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
6486.1987.tb00467.x.
Pettigrew, A. M. (2012). Context and action in the transformation of the ﬁrm: A
reprise. Journal of Management Studies, 49(7), 1304e1328. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1111/j.1467-6486.2012.01054.x.
Pettigrew, A. M., & Whipp, R. (1991). Managing change for competitive success. Ox-
ford: Blackwell.
Powell, W. W., White, D. R., Koput, K. W., & Owen-Smith, J. (2005). Network Dy-
namics and Field Evolution: The Growth of Interorganizational Collaboration in
the Life Sciences. The American Journal of Sociology, 110(4), 1132e1205.
Power, M. (1997). From risk society to audit society. Soziale Systeme, 3(1), 3e21.
Power, M. (2000). The audit society d second thoughts. International Journal of
Auditing, 4(1), 111e119. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1099-1123.00306.
Pugliese, A., Bezemer, P.-J., Zattoni, A., Huse, M., van den Bosch, F. A. J., &
Volberda, H. W. (2009). Boards of directors' contribution to strategy: A litera-
ture review and research agenda. Corporate Governance: An International Re-
view, 17(3), 292e306.
Pye, A. (2002). Corporate directing: Governing, strategising and leading in action.
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 10(3), 153e162. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8683.00280.
Rong, K., & Shi, Y. (2014). Business ecosystems: Constructs, conﬁgurations, and the
nurturing process. Basingstoke, Hants: Palgrave Macmillan.
Rouleau, L. (2013). Strategy-as-practice research at a crossroads.Management, 16(5),
574e592. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/mana.165.0574.
Stiles, P. (2001). The impact of the board on Strategy: An empirical examination.
Journal of Management Studies, 38(5), 627e650.
Sturdy, A. (1997). The consultancy process d an insecure business? Journal of
Management Studies, 34(3), 389e413. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-
6486.00056.
Sturdy, A., Schwarz, M., & Spicer, A. (2006). Guess who's coming to dinner?
Structures and uses of liminality in strategic management consultancy. Human
Relations, 59(7), 929e960. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0018726706067597.
Taylor, S., & Spicer, A. (2007). Time for space: A narrative review of research on
organizational spaces. International Journal of Management Reviews, 9(4),
325e346. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2370.2007.00214.x.rds strategizing in liminal spaces: Process and practice, formal and
6/j.emj.2017.03.008
M. Concannon, D. Nordberg / European Management Journal xxx (2017) 1e1212Tempest, S., & Starkey, K. (2004). The effects of liminality on individual and orga-
nizational learning. Organization Studies, 25(4), 507e527. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1177/0170840604040674.
Thornton, P. H., Ocasio, W., & Lounsbury, M. (2012). The institutional logics
perspective: A new approach to culture, structure, and process. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Torchia, M., Calabro, A., & Huse, M. (2011). Women directors on corporate Boards:
From tokenism to critical mass. Journal of Business Ethics, 102(2), 299e317.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10551-011-0815-z.
Turner, V. W. (1977). The ritual Process: Structure and anti-structure. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press.
UK Parliament. (2006). Companies act. Retrieved June 20, 2007, from http://www.
legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/contents.Please cite this article in press as: Concannon, M., & Nordberg, D., Boa
informal, European Management Journal (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.101Westphal, J. D., & Zajac, E. J. (1998). The symbolic management of Stockholders:
Corporate governance reforms and shareholder reactions. Administrative Sci-
ence Quarterly, 43(1), 127e153.
Whittington, R. (1996). Strategy as practice. Long Range Planning, 29(5), 731e735.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0024-6301(96)00068-4.
Whittington, R., Molloy, E., Mayer, M., & Smith, A. (2006). Practices of strategising/
organising: Broadening strategy work and skills. Long Range Planning, 39(6),
615e629. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.lrp.2006.10.004.
Zahra, S. A., & Pearce, J. A., II (1989). Boards of directors and corporate ﬁnancial
performance: A review and integrative model. Journal of Management, 15(2),
291e334.
Zucker, L. G. (1977). The role of institutionalization in cultural persistence. American
Sociological Review, 42(5), 726e743.rds strategizing in liminal spaces: Process and practice, formal and
6/j.emj.2017.03.008
